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Abstract
How do market-based channels for the provision of liquidity affect financial liber-
alization and contagion? In order to answer this question, I extend the Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) model of financial intermediation to a two-country environment with
unobservable markets for borrowing and lending and comparative advantages in the
investment technologies. I demonstrate that the role of hidden markets crucially de-
pends on the level of financial integration of the economy. Despite always imposing a
burden on intermediaries, unobservable markets allow agents to partially enjoy gains
from financial integration when interbank markets are autarkic. In fully liberalized
systems such effect instead disappears. Similarly, in autarky the distortion created by
hidden markets improve the resilience of the system to unexpected liquidity shocks.
With fully integrated interbank markets, such effect again disappears, as unexpected
liquidity shocks always lead to bankruptcy and contagion.
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1 Introduction
In the present paper, I address the following issue: how do market-based channels for the
provision of liquidity affect financial liberalization and contagion? This is an important
question in the current debate about financial intermediation, as in the last forty years
there has been a ”horse race” between two different systems: the ”Anglo-Saxon”, with its
unregulated market-based structure and extensive financial innovation, and the ”Continen-
tal European”, traditionally bank-based. Such debate apparently settled at the end of the
Nineties: both researchers in academia and policy makers in practice agreed that the first
one was the way to go to ensure an efficient allocation of risk, and as a consequence foster
financial and economic growth. The impetuous wave of financial liberalization across the
world was just another effect of the general consensus about the issue. Nevertheless, the
calamitous events of the 2007-2009 financial crisis reopened the discussion, as the European
model showed more resilience to unexpected shocks and bank runs than the other. In fact,
according to the latest data,1 the United States administration spent around US$ 2 trillion
in bailing out the financial system, and in Europe United Kingdom spent alone more than
900 million euros, which represent half of the total public intervention of the whole conti-
nent. As a counterexample, France, Italy and Spain, where a bank-based financial system
is present, did not spend more than 100 million euros overall.
With the present paper, I give a theoretical contribution to this debate. I start from the
standard workhorse model for normative and positive analysis of financial intermediation
developed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In their model, financial intermediaries (or more
commonly, banks) provide risk sharing against the realization of idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks by offering maturity, liquidity and credit transformation. Banks ex ante collect
deposits and make investments on behalf of their customers, and offer a contract that states
how much agents are allowed to withdraw ex post, depending on their random preferences
for liquidity. In order to study the interaction of different regulatory environments on
financial liberalization and on the resilience of financial systems to unexpected liquidity
shocks, I extend this model in two directions: first, I assume a two-sector (or region, or
country) environment, in which banks enjoy a regulatory comparative advantage in the
available investment technology; second, I study the role of market-based financial systems
via the introduction of hidden borrowing and lending.
The reasons for such hypotheses deserve some explanations. On the one hand, I use the
1See the report by Mediobanca Research Department (2010) at http://www.mbres.it/eng/download/rs
main financial stabilization plans.pdf.
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two-sector environment to analyze different institutional set-ups in the interbank market.
I will compare different cases in which banks in one country either are or are not allowed
to make deposits into banks in the other country, as a proxy for liberalized versus rigid
financial systems. On the other hand, the introduction of an informational friction in the
form of hidden savings is made to formally take into account the recent developments in
financial innovation and the emergence of a series of unregulated markets, intermediaries
and structures known as ”shadow banking system”. According to Pozsar et al. (2010),
”shadow banks are financial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit and liquidity
transformation without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees”.
No measure of the dimension of the shadow banking system existed until recently (current
estimates argue the total amount of resources traded can be as large as US$ 12 Trillion), as
for their intimate essence the actions of such operators are difficult to track. Nevertheless,
we can draw some evidence by taking total financial assets as a proxy for the dimension of
such sector.2 Data show that for the shadow banking system such value grew from U.S.$
2.5 billion in the early Nineties to a peak of U.S.$ 24 billion in 2007. This tenfold growth
is even more noteworthy if we take into account that total financial assets of traditional
commercial banks have not increased at the same pace: in fact, while at the beginning of
the Nineties the ratio of shadow banking to commercial banks’ total assets was 52 percent,
before the beginning of the financial crisis it peaked at 200 percent. From the point of
view of the present work, the lesson I draw is therefore that a great part of the wealth in
the United States has been conveyed in the economy through ”off-the-counter” unobserved
channels, hence the introduction of unobservable savings captures a fundamental feature
of the current financial system that researchers cannot ignore.
In this environment, I am able to prove the following results. In competitive equilib-
rium, the presence of hidden markets always imposes a burden on financial intermediaries,
who see their choice sets compressed by the necessary incentive compatibility. Nevertheless,
hidden markets have different effects on the equilibrium outcome, depending on the level of
integration in the ”official” financial market: when international interbank markets are not
developed, cross-country borrowing and lending, even if unobservable, do increase welfare
with respect to the case of complete economic isolation, because in this way agents partially
enjoy gains from financial integration. On the contrary, when international interbank mar-
kets are fully liberalized, hidden markets only have a negative effect: were hidden markets
closed, the competitive equilibrium would indeed be equivalent to the social optimum.
2Data are taken from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States.
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On the other side, in order to study financial contagion I analyze the resilience of
the financial system to a perturbation: I introduce the state S¯, in which suddenly and
unexpectedly the number of agents in early liquidity need increases. Were the economy
divided into autarkic regions, I prove that international shadow markets would distort the
optimal allocation of consumption towards late consumers, and push banks to specialize
their investment strategies. That in turn is beneficial for the resilience of the system, since
banks always have enough resources to cover for extra liquidity needs. That does not come
at no cost, though: unexpected liquidity shocks would still produce winners and losers from
the redistribution of resources via the hidden market.
When the interbank market is opened, the positive stabilizing effect of hidden markets
instead disappears, as banks do trade internationally and therefore do not specialize in
liquid assets. Therefore, banks always go bankrupt, and there is always contagion. The
introduction of optimal regulation, to overcome the inefficient allocation of resources in
competitive equilibrium, in fact does not solve the instability of the system, as banks are
forced to hold less long assets and therefore lower the buffers with which they might cover
the extra liquidity needs. Therefore, my conclusion is again that the role of hidden markets
in the development of financial contagion crucially depends on the underlying structure of
the interbank market.
The present paper contributes to different topics in the literature. In general, it belongs
to a wide and revamping line of research on financial intermediation, which has in the
already mentioned work by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) its cornerstone. In particular, it
embraces the ”business cycle” view about the origin of financial crises, which has in Gorton
(1988) its first and most important contributor. According to that view, financial crises are
not the outcome of self-fulfilling prophecies, as in the standard Diamond-Dybvig model,
but are consequences of real shocks affecting the economy, that is, an equilibrium outcome.
In addition to that, my paper is also related to the literature that rationalizes international
transmission of financial shocks through interbank channels, like in Allen and Gale (2000)
or Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007). The importance of such approach has been further
strengthened by recent empirical analysis of default and contagion in networks of banks
(Iyer and Peydro´, 2010; Imai and Takarabe, 2011).
More importantly, the present work represents an extension of the analysis on hidden
savings and financial intermediation proposed by Farhi et al. (2009). In particular, the
authors highlight the distortion that hidden markets for borrowing and lending impose on
the banking contract in decentralized environments. By extending their set-up to a two-
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country environment, I am able to further analyze how such distortion affects financial
liberalization and the resilience of the system to unexpected liquidity shocks.
The paper is organized as follows: in sections 2 to 4, I define the environment of the
problem, characterize the socially optimal allocation and the decentralized equilibrium
both with autarkic and liberalized interbank markets. Section 5 is devoted to the analysis
of financial contagion. In section 6 I further show how the proposed analysis sheds some
light on the crisis of the U.S. banking system between the end of the Seventies and the
beginning of the Nineties (the so-called ”S&L debacle”). Section 7 concludes.
2 Environment
The basic structure of the model is a standard Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of
financial intermediation. The economy lasts for three periods t = 0, 1, 2, and is divided into
two countries (or sectors) i ∈ {H,F}. Each country is populated by µi ex ante identical
agents, with µH + µF = 1, who are born at date 0 with an equal endowment e = 1,
and by a continuum of Bertrand-competitive financial intermediaries (or more commonly,
banks), who operate in an official market with free entry, and offer real deposit contracts
to individuals. I assume the relationship between customers and banks is exclusive, in the
sense that agents can only deposit their endowment into banks in their own sector. There
are four assets available in the economy: two short assets, which are essentially a storage
technology that yield one unit of consumption good in t + 1 for each unit invested in t,
and two country-specific long assets, which deliver RˆF > RˆH > 1 units of consumption in
period t = 2 for each unit invested in t = 0. In this respect, the short asset is ”liquid”, as it
provides a way to move resources from one period to the following, while the long asset is
”illiquid”, as it has a longer maturity. In the design of the assumption that RˆF > RˆH , I have
in mind a situation in which different parts of a composite financial system have different
regulatory environments, and hence different technologies to move resources across time.
In that sense, I define this hypothesis a ”regulatory comparative advantage”.
Agents are affected by idiosyncratic uncertainty, in the form of a preference shock. Being
ex-ante equal, in t = 1 every consumer draws a type θ ∈ {0, 1} which is private information
to herself. Individual types affect the point in time at which agents enjoy consumption,
according to the utility function U(ci1, c
i
2, θ) = (1 − θ)u(ci1) + βθu(ci2). Clearly, if θ = 0
the agent is willing to consume only at date 1, while if θ = 1 she will consume only at
date 2. As it is customary in this line of research, I will then refer to type-0 and type-1
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agents as early and late consumers, respectively. The felicity function u(c) is assumed to
be increasing, twice continuously differentiable, concave, and satisfying Inada conditions.
Moreover I restrict my attention to the class of felicity functions characterized by relative
risk aversion bigger than or equal to unity, that is −u′′(c)c
u′(c) ≥ 1, and assume throughout the
rest of the paper that βRˆH > 1.
Finally, define the probability of being of type θ in sector i as pii(θ) > 0. I assume that
preference shocks are independent across agents, so that by the law of large number the
cross-sectional distribution of types is equivalent to the probability distribution. Moreover,
it must be that
∑
θ pi
i(θ) = µi in any sector.
2.1 The Banking Contract
At the beginning of date 0, agents deposit their endowments in banks in their own coun-
try, and sign a banking contract. This stipulates the amount of consumption goods that
customers are entitled to withdraw from their banks at date 1 and 2, depending on their
types. Define the consumption bundle Ci(θ) = {ci1(θ), ci2(θ)}.
Once collected all the deposits, banks decide how to allocate them. Specifically, they
may buy an amount X i of short assets, and an amount Y i of long assets. The structure of
such markets is exogenous, and reflects two different institutional environments: in the first
one, banks are in autarky, and can only invest in assets available in their own country; in
the second, they are instead allowed to make deposits into banks in other sectors, and ask
them to invest in short or long assets on their behalf. I will then call the first environment
”autarkic” and the second one ”liberalized” or ”integrated”.
Notice that in the following I focus my attention on pure strategy equilibria, where
banks in the same group have symmetric investment strategies. Therefore, without loss of
generality I can restrict myself to the analysis of a representative bank.
2.2 The Shadow Market
The second market in this economy opens at t = 1, after all the uncertainty is realized,
when agents have the opportunity to engage in side trades. I model this feature as unob-
servable exchanges, through which individuals can freely borrow and lend across countries
an amount bi of uncontingent bonds yielding a ”shadow return” R to be determined in
equilibrium. Notice that, despite the fact that agents can only deposit their endowment
in banks in their own country, I allow them to directly trade at a later stage. Moreover,
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the fact that agents trade only uncontingent bonds is not an a priori restriction on the
completeness of the hidden market, but an endogenous feature of the hidden market. I
prove that in appendix A.3
I formalize the problem faced by the agents in the shadow market in the following way.
Individuals take their decisions to borrow or lend at the end of date 1. State variables
of the program are the banking contract Ci(θ) signed in the official banking sector, the
shadow return R that emerges in equilibrium, and the individual type. Then, the problem
in the shadow market reads:
V (Ci(θ), R, θ) = max
xi1,x
i
2,b
i,θ′
U(xi1, x
i
2, θ) (1)
s.t. xi1 + b
i = ci1(θ
′)
xi2 −Rbi = ci2(θ′)
Given the state variables, individuals decide which type θ′ to report to the official sector
(which will affect the amount of resources available for side trades), how much to consume
in the two periods, and how much to borrow or lend in the shadow market.
So far the environment describes a complex game of asymmetric information between
banks and depositors. Nevertheless, by the Revelation Principle I can focus my attention
to truth-telling mechanisms in which agents have incentives to reveal their individual types
to the banks. The incentive compatibility constraint can then be defined in the following
way:
Definition 1. A banking contract Ci(θ) is incentive compatible if:
V (Ci(θ), R, θ) ≥ V (Ci(θ′), R, θ) (2)
for any θ, θ′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Incentive compatibility states that each agent should find optimal to truthfully report
her type, but given the presence of only two types, this can be simplified:
3I could have modeled the shadow market so that agents were allowed to write side contracts with
financial institutions in other sectors. Instead, I follow Farhi et al. (2009) and assume that they trade
only with other individuals. That would not change the main implications of the paper, while consistently
simplifying the analysis.
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Lemma 1. A banking contract Ci(θ) is incentive compatible if:
ci1(0) +
ci2(0)
R
= ci1(1) +
ci2(1)
R
(3)
Proof. In Appendix D. 
Truth-telling therefore implies that the banking contract should entitle agents to the
same present discounted value of consumption, evaluated at the return on the shadow
investment.
2.3 Timing
It is useful at this point to summarize the timing of actions: at date 0, each agent deposits
her endowment into banks in her own country, hence total deposits are µi. Banks then
set up full contingent incentive-compatible contracts with depositors, entitling them to an
amount of real consumption at date 1 and 2, depending on the reported type. Banks also
decide the portfolio allocation between long and short assets. At t = 1, all uncertainty is
resolved: each agent gets to know her private type, and according to the report they make
to the bank receives consumption goods ci1(θ). Once having withdrawn, agents induce in
side trades in the hidden market. Finally, at t = 2 individuals receive consumption goods
ci2(θ) in accordance with the banking contract, and the return on the shadow investment.
3 Constrained Efficient Allocation
As a benchmark case, in this section I characterize the socially optimal allocation. In
particular, the planner chooses the optimal contract {Ci(θ)} for any consumer in the
economy and the efficient portfolio allocation between short and long assets in order to
maximize the sum of expected ex-ante welfare. In doing so, the planner is subject to the
constraint that the portfolio allocation must provide enough resources to pay consumption
in both periods to any agent of any type. In addition, remember that individual types are
private information. We can then apply the Revelation Principle and restrict the social
planner to truth-telling mechanisms in which every agent correctly report her type and
does not trade in the hidden market. The planning problem reads:
max
{X,Y i,Ci(θ)}θ∈{0,1}
i∈{H,F}
∑
i
∑
θ
pii(θ)U(Ci(θ), θ) (4)
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subject to the resource constraints:
X + Y H + Y F = 1∑
i
∑
θ
pii(θ)ci1(θ) ≤ X (5)∑
i
∑
θ
pii(θ)ci2(θ) ≤ RˆHY H + RˆFY F
and the incentive compatibility constraint:
U(Ci(θ), θ) ≥ V (Ci(θ), R, θ) (6)
which must hold for any type and any sector.
Notice that, given that the investment in the short assets in both H and F yields the
same return, I define as X the total investment in the short asset. On the contrary, Y H
and Y F are the investments in the long assets of H and F. Since by assumption RˆF > RˆH ,
the planner will optimally invest only in F’s long asset. I report the full definition of the
constrained efficient allocation in the Appendix. Moreover, I also prove that the program
can be simplified along the lines proposed by Farhi et al. (2009). The constrained efficient
allocation is characterized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. The constrained efficient allocation in presence of hidden markets is:
ci1(1) = c
i
2(0) = 0
ci1(0) = I∗ > 1 (7)
ci2(1) = R
∗I∗ < RˆF
for any i ∈ {H,F}, where {R∗, I∗} is the solution to:
u′(IH∗)
u′(IF∗) = 1 =
u′(R∗IH∗)
u′(R∗IF∗)
βRˆFu′(R∗I∗) = u′(I∗) (8)
∑
i
I∗
[
pii(0) +
R∗
RˆF
pii(1)
]
= 1
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Moreover, the efficient return in the shadow market is:
1 < R∗ ≤ βRˆF < RˆF (9)
and the optimal total investment in the short asset is:
X∗ =
∑
i
pii(0)I∗ (10)
Proof. In appendix D. 
The planner optimally does not provide any consumption at date 1 to late consumers,
and at date 2 to early consumers. She chooses the allocation of resources so as to imple-
ment cross-country risk sharing (i.e. she provides the same consumption regardless of the
country) and intertemporal risk sharing (i.e. she ensures an ex-ante Eurler equation holds).
The effect of that is a reduction in ex-post income volatility (ci1(0) > 1 and c
i
2(1) < Rˆ
F ):
the planner ensures agents against the risk of being hit by a liquidity shock by pooling
deposits and shifting resources from late consumers to early consumers.
Furthermore, the planner also needs to satisfy incentive compatibility, and she does
so by ensuring that the return on the shadow market is strictly lower than the return on
the chosen long asset RˆF , so as to lower incentives to misreport individual types. For the
sake of clarity, assume utility is CRRA. Then by rearranging the Euler equation, we have
R∗ = (βRˆF )
1
σ : the optimal return on the hidden investment reflects consumption smoothing
motivations, i.e. the willingness of agents to hedge against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
The higher relative risk aversion σ, the more agents want a smooth consumption profile.
Therefore, in order for incentive compatibility to hold, the hidden return R∗ should get
closer to unity.
Finally, it is easy to see that in this environment the constrained efficient allocation is
equivalent to the unconstrained efficient one: they both provide efficient cross-country and
iter-temporal risk sharing, while exhausting resources. Moreover, in the same environment
with no hidden trades, a version of the first welfare theorem holds: the competitive equilib-
rium is equivalent to the social optimum. This result was proved in a more general set-up
by Allen and Gale (2004). I provide some intuition for that in Appendix B.
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4 Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, I define and characterize the market equilibrium of the environment de-
scribed in the previous section. I solve for the consumption allocation and the portfolio
strategy by backward induction, where the first stage is represented by the savings problem
(1) that each agent solves in the hidden market.
At date 0, then banks choose the optimal investment strategy and the banking contract
so as to maximize expected ex post utility:4∑
θ
pii(θ)V (Ci(θ), R, θ) (11)
subject to incentive compatibility (3) and the budget constraint. The structure of the
interbank market affects the latter, in particular which long asset banks can invest into.
In the following, I concentrate my attention on three different cases. In the first one, no
international transaction is possible: there is no interbank market, and the shadow market
is limited to be domestic. In the second one, banks are still forbidden from making deposits
one into each other, but agents can exchange resources in a international hidden market.
Finally, in the third case, there exist both an international interbank market and a cross-
country shadow market. I will show how different degrees of openness affect how shadow
markets influence the economic outcome.
4.1 Autarky with Domestic Hidden Markets
In this first institutional set-up, there are no international markets: banks are not allowed
to trade in an interbank market, and the hidden market for borrowing and lending is
constrained to be only local. The budget constraint in each country i then is:
X i + Y i ≤ µi∑
θ
pii(θ)ci1(θ) ≤ X i (12)∑
θ
pii(θ)ci2(θ) ≤ RˆiY i
4The assumption of Bertrand competition among banks drives profits to zero in equilibrium and lets
me focus on the dual problem.
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Notice that each country is forced to invest in the domestic long assets, whose return is
Rˆi. The definition of competitive equilibrium is straightforward:
Definition 2. Given an initial endowment e for any agent and a distribution of idiosyn-
cratic shocks {pii(θ)}, a competitive equilibrium in autarky is a vector of hidden returns
{RiA} on the two local shadow markets,5 a banking contract {Ci(θ)}, a portfolio alloca-
tion {X i, Y i} and an amount of bonds bi(Ci(θ), R, θ) for any country i ∈ {H,F} and type
θ ∈ {0, 1}, such that:
• For given return RiA, the allocation solves the problem in the shadow market
• The allocation solves the banking problem
• Resources are exhausted:∑
θ
pii(θ)
[
ci1(θ) +
ci2(θ)
Rˆi
]
= µi ∀i ∈ {H,F} (13)
∑
θ
pii(θ)bi(Ci(θ), RiA, θ) = 0 (14)
In the definition of the equilibrium, I am assuming that resources must be exhausted
in each country, and the shadow market must clear locally.
To find the solution to the program, I follow these steps: first, characterize the return
on the shadow investment; second, solve agents’ optimal strategy in the shadow market,
for given banking contract; third, solve for the optimal banking contract. The first task is
intuitive: the return on investments in each shadow market must be equal to the return to
the local investment technology, i.e. RiA = Rˆi. The intuition for this result is straightfor-
ward. There are two ways banks can provide consumption to late consumers, and by the
assumption of perfect competition they must be equivalent. They can invest one unit of
consumption at date 0 in the long asset, and get Rˆi at date 2, or they can invest one unit
of consumption in the short asset, collect one at date 1, and give it to the consumers for
them to invest in the shadow market, whose return is RiA. Therefore, the result follows.6
Lemma 3. In an autarkic competitive equilibrium with domestic hidden markets, RiA = Rˆi.
5The superscript A stands for ”autarky”.
6There is a third way for banks to provide consumption to late consumers: invest twice in the short
asset, at dates 0 and 1. This strategy would yield one unit of consumption for each unit invested, hence is
dominated by the other two.
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Proof. In the text above. 
The main consequence of such lemma is that the portfolio allocation between short and
long assets is not determined. Despite indeterminacy, I am still able to back up the optimal
banking contract, though. Banks in both sectors find inefficient to provide consumption
to late consumers at date 1 and to early consumers at date 2, because that would be
costly but not give any welfare to consumers. That in turn implies ci1(0) = c
i
2(1)/R
iA by
incentive compatibility. Then the resource constraint gives the equilibrium allocation, and
as a consequence the equilibrium investment strategy, that I summarize here:
Proposition 1. The autarkic competitive equilibrium with domestic hidden markets is
characterized by the optimal banking contract:
ci2(0) = c
i
1(1) = 0
ci1(0) = 1 (15)
ci2(1) = Rˆ
i
and the equilibrium investment strategy is:
X i = pii(0) (16)
Y i = µi − pii(0) (17)
for any i ∈ {H,F},
Proof. In the text above. 
The intuition for such result is the following: banks are forced to implement an incentive
compatible contract. But the return on the hidden market does not reflect the willingness
of agents to hedge against idiosyncratic shocks as in the planner problem, but only ar-
bitrage conditions between the observable and the unobservable markets. Therefore, this
competitive equilibrium is highly inefficient: clearly, it does not provide any cross-country
risk sharing, as late consumers are entitled to different amounts of consumption in the
two different countries. Moreover, such equilibrium does not ensure any intertemporal risk
sharing, too: an ex ante Euler equation here does not hold. This is an adapted version of a
more general result that arises in models with hidden trades: in a competitive equilibrium,
agents are not able to get more insurance than the one they might get if they were in
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complete autarky (i.e. if no bank was present).7
4.2 Autarky with International Hidden Markets
In this second case, banks are still not allowed to make cross-borders deposits. At the same
time, countries are not isolated: agents can now operate in an international hidden market
for borrowing and lending. Banks’ budget constraint in each country i is exactly the same
as before, and also the definition of competitive equilibrium is similar to the previous case,
with two exceptions: now there is only one return on the hidden investment labeled RA,
and I impose that in equilibrium the hidden market for bonds must clear internationally:∑
i
∑
θ
pii(θ)bi(Ci(θ), RA, θ) = 0 (18)
I follow the same steps as before to characterize the solution, hence I start from the
return to the hidden investment RA. This must lie between RˆH and RˆF . Were it lower than
RˆH , banks in both sectors would find convenient to invest only in their own long assets
and let depositors trade on the shadow market. But if that is the case, early consumers in
both sectors would not be able to borrow on the shadow market, because there would be
no lenders. Therefore, (14) is not satisfied, and that cannot be an equilibrium. Similarly, it
cannot be the case that RA is bigger than RˆF , because otherwise banks would invest only
in the short assets, and late consumers would not find anyone to lend to in the shadow
market. I recap this in the following lemma:
Lemma 4. In an autarkic competitive equilibrium with international hidden markets,
RˆH < RA < RˆF .
Proof. In the text above. 
7If there are no banks, each individual directly buys short and long assets. Assume that when she gets
to know her type, each agent then sells at price P the security that does not need on a secondary market.
More formally:
max
X,Y
θu(c1) + β(1− θ)u(c2)
subject to X + Y = 1 and:
X + PY = c1 ; Rˆ
(
X
P
+ Y
)
= c2
Since there must be no arbitrage opportunities between investing in short and long assets, in equilibrium
it must be the case that P = 1. Then from the budget constraint the consumption allocation is: c1 = 1
and c2 = Rˆ.
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Given the result above, it is then clear that banks in H find optimal to invest only
in the short technology, and let late consumers lend in the shadow market so that they
enjoy a higher return. On the contrary banks in F invest only in the long technology, and
let domestic early consumers borrow. Given this result, I can rewrite the market clearing
condition in the hidden bond market as:
piH(1)cH1 (1) = pi
F (0)
cF2 (0)
RA
(19)
That means the total amount lent by H’s late consumers (the left hand side) in equilibrium
must be equal to the total amount borrowed by F’s early consumers (the right hand side).
Equation (19) also points out that the existence of an equilibrium in the shadow banking
system is dependent on the availability of the right number of borrowers and lenders. Thus,
the existence of the equilibrium is ensured by the mild assumption:
Assumption 1. Rˆ
H
RˆF
< pi
F (0)
piH(1)
< 1
Given the market clearing condition in the bond hidden market, ex-post welfare is:
V H(CH(0), RA, 0) = u(cH1 (0))
V H(CH(1), RA, 1) = βu(RAcH1 (1))
V F (CF (0), RA, 0) = u
(
cF2 (0)
RA
)
V F (CF (1), RA, 1) = βu(cF2 (1))
With those in hand, I can finally characterize the autarkic equilibrium:
Proposition 2. In autarkic competitive equilibrium with international hidden markets, the
banking contract is:
cH2 (0) = c
H
2 (1) = c
F
1 (0) = c
F
1 (1) = 0
cH1 (0) = c
H
1 (1) = 1 (20)
cF2 (0) = c
F
2 (1) = Rˆ
F
and the equilibrium investment strategy is:
XH = Y F = 1 (21)
XF = Y H = 0 (22)
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The return on the shadow market is:
RA =
piF (0)
piH(1)
RˆF
Proof. In appendix D. 
The intuition for this result is straightforward: banks in each sector specialize their
investments in those assets in which they enjoy their regulatory comparative advantage,
and let agents trade in the shadow market to achieve maximum possible welfare. The im-
portant step at this point is to analyze the amount of risk sharing provided by bank in this
environment. In order to do so, remember that the banking contract and the consumption
allocation are different, because of the presence of the shadow market. Nevertheless, from
the expressions for ex-post welfare it is easy to back up consumption bundles as:
xH1 (0) = 1 x
H
2 (1) =
piF (0)
piH(1)
RˆF
xF1 (0) =
piH(1)
piF (0)
xF2 (1) = Rˆ
F
From this, it is clear that both cross-country and intertemporal risk sharing are not pro-
vided in this case, too.
It is important at this point to compare these first two cases: in autarky, irrespective
of the presence of international hidden markets, banks are not able to provide insurance
against idiosyncratic shocks or hedge against the ex ante heterogeneity represented by the
country structure of the economy. Nevertheless, hidden markets allow agents to partially
enjoy gains from financial integration, and that is the reason why the equilibrium with
international hidden markets Pareto-dominates the one with local hidden markets. This
conclusion will change when I take into account financial integration.
4.3 Liberalized Economy with International Hidden Markets
In contrast to what happens in autarky, in this last case I assume that banks are allowed
to make cross-country deposits. In that sense, banks offer to their customers financial
products that are not their own, through the channel of interbank trade. Formally, given
that RˆH < RˆF , banks in H will not invest in their own long asset, but make deposits into
banks in F and ask them to invest in the long assets on their behalf. The returns on the
two short technologies available in the economy are equal, but without loss of generality I
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assume that banks in F will make deposits into banks in H and invest in the foreign short
asset.8 Therefore, the intertemporal budget constraint of a bank in country i now is:
∑
θ
piθ
[
ci1(θ) +
ci2(θ)
RˆF
]
= µi (23)
Notice that here banks in both countries discount date 2 consumption using the return on
the long asset RˆF .
Formally, the definition of integrated equilibrium is not different from the previous one.
The only exception is the resource constraint. Now, given that markets are liberalized and
banks are free to make interbank deposits, it reads:
∑
i
∑
θ
pii(θ)
[
ci1(θ) +
ci2(θ)
RˆF
]
≤ 1 (24)
because resources must be exhausted in the whole economy.
Again, the characterization of the equilibrium starts from the derivation of the return
in the shadow market. As before, I use arbitrage motivation to show that the hidden return
RL must be equal to RˆF : were it lower, banks in both sectors would only invest in the long
asset, and early consumers would be willing to borrow, but they would not find any lender.
Symmetric line of reasoning rules out the case in which RL > RˆF .
Lemma 5. In integrated equilibrium, the return on the shadow market is RL = RˆF .
Proof. In the text above. 
As in the case with domestic hidden markets, consequence of this lemma is that the
portfolio allocation between short and long asset is undetermined. The same lines of rea-
soning as before lead me to the characterization of the equilibrium consumption allocation:
Proposition 3. The integrated equilibrium is characterized by the optimal banking con-
tract:
ci2(0) = c
i
1(1) = 0
ci1(0) = 1 (25)
ci2(1) = Rˆ
F
8I could formalize this point by assuming that the return on the short technology in country H is a
small  > 1, but that would just add to the notation.
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and the portfolio allocation:
X i = pii(0) (26)
Y i = µi − pii(0) (27)
for any i ∈ {H,F},
Proof. In the text above. 
Given this result about the optimal contract, and the fact that banks do know the
probability distribution of idiosyncratic shocks, I can show that the total investment in
the short asset in equilibrium is XL =
∑
i pi
i(0), and as a consequence total investment
in the long asset is Y L = 1 − XL: total asset allocation in this economy is inefficient, as
banks are too leveraged, i.e. do not invest enough in liquidity. Moreover, I can prove that
intertemporal allocation is not satisfied either: the Euler equation does not hold. On the
contrary, in the integrated equilibrium banks offer the same contract regardless of countries
because they invest in the very same assets. Thus, they provide optimal cross-country risk
sharing.
4.4 Summary
It is important at this point, to review my main findings so far. The presence of hidden
markets always imposes a burden on financial intermediaries, who see their choice sets
compressed by the necessary incentive compatibility. Nevertheless, hidden markets have
different effects on the equilibrium outcome, depending on the market environment: when
interbank markets are not developed, cross-country borrowing and lending, even if un-
observable, do increase welfare with respect to the case of complete economic isolation,
because in this way agents may partially enjoy gains from financial integration. On the
contrary, when international interbank markets are into place, hidden markets only have
a negative effect: as I mentioned in section 3, were hidden markets closed, the competitive
equilibrium would indeed be equivalent to the social optimum.
In the next section, I will repeat the comparison between the three proposed environ-
ments, but to answer a new question: do hidden markets affect the resilience of the financial
system to unexpected liquidity shocks?
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5 Financial Contagion
In the present section, I analyze how the presence of hidden markets affects bankruptcy
and financial contagion. To do so, I take as a starting point the seminal work by Allen
and Gale (2000). Notice that I explicitly focus my attention only on intrinsic default, i.e.
default that has its origin in fundamental characteristics of the economy. This is in contrast
with the literature that tries to explain bankruptcy as a consequence of self-fulfilling bank
runs dependent on the realization of extrinsic events like sunspots.
Assume at date 1 state S¯ is realized, in which suddenly and unexpectedly the number
of agents in early liquidity need in country H spikes up to piH(0) + , and as a consequence
the probability of being an early consumers decreases to piH(1) − . By the fact that the
state S¯ was not foreseen by intermediaries at date 0, the banking contract is still equal
to the one characterized in the previous sections. In order to fulfill the extra demand of
liquidity, in state S¯ banks might be forced to liquidate part of their holdings of the long
asset before maturity. That comes at a cost: for any unit liquidated, banks raise only r < 1
units of consumption via a liquidation technology. In state S¯ then three cases are possible:
banks are solvent, when they have enough resources (in terms of available liquidity) to
pay for the extra demand; banks are insolvent, when they are forced to liquidate some of
their holdings of the long asset; banks are bankrupt, when they are not able to fulfill their
contractual obligations even by liquidating their whole portfolios. In case of bankruptcy, I
assume banks are forced to sell all their assets and equally divide the proceedings among
all their depositors. Therefore, in the following I address the role of hidden markets in
inducing bankruptcy in H when the state S¯ is realized, and ask whether the network of
interbank deposits (if any) in turn induces bankruptcy also in F, in which case I talk about
”contagion”.
In the distinction mentioned above between the three possible cases (solvency, insol-
vency, bankruptcy), I implicitly assume there is a so called pecking order with which banks
liquidate their assets to fulfill the demand for consumption in period 1. The fact that banks
first use the short asset and only afterwards the long asset is an endogenous feature of this
set-up. Each asset indeed has different opportunity-cost of shifting consumption from date
2 to date 1. Such cost for the short asset is clearly equal to 1. For the long asset instead
it is different: by liquidating one unit, banks get rid of Rˆi units of future consumption to
create r units of consumption at date 1. Hence, the cost of shifting resources from 2 to 1
is Rˆi/r > 1, and that is the reason why banks use the short asset first.
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5.1 The General Case
I now summarize the main features of the model, as defined in Allen and Gale (2000).
When state S¯ materializes, banks in H face an extra demand of liquidity of cH1 (0). Define
buffer the value that banks can raise by liquidating the long asset while leaving enough
resources to pay late consumers in date 2. For given number of early consumers ω, the
buffer then is:
f i(ω) = r
[
Y i − (µi − ω)
∑
θ
ci2(θ)
Rˆi
]
(28)
where Y i is again the holding of the long asset, and ci2(θ) is the amount of consumption
promised for date 2 as defined in the contract, which is discounted at rate Rˆi. Clearly,
banks in H are bankrupt if the buffer is not enough to pay for the extra liquidity demand,
that is:
cH1 (0) > f(pi
H(0) + ) (29)
If the condition (29) is satisfied, banks are forced to close down, liquidate all their assets
and share the proceedings with all their depositors, both domestic and foreign. Assume
that banks in F promised cF1 (0) to their local early consumers (whose measure is pi
F (0)),
and that in order to fulfill their obligations they made a short-term deposit in banks in H.
Then the proceedings from liquidation, defined as qH , come from the complete clearing of
the budget in H’s banks:
XH + rY H = qH(µH + piF (0)) (30)
where XH represents the total holdings of the short asset. The balance budget in (30) states
that at bankruptcy total resources are the sum of short asset holdings and the liquidation
value of the long asset, and that banks in H share that amount between µH local depositors
and piF (0) foreign deposits. Rearranging:
qH =
XH + rY H
µH + piF (0)
(31)
What happens to banks in F is then straightforward: they promised cF1 (0) to pi
F (0) agents,
but in case of bankruptcy in H they only receive qH . Hence they declare default if:
piF (0)(cF1 (0)− qH) > f(piF (0)) (32)
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This last expression means that banks in F suffer from contagion if their buffers are not
enough to cover for the loss in consumption goods due to bankruptcy in country H. Allen
and Gale (2000) formally prove that conditions (29) and (32) are sufficient for an intrinsic
shock to generate default in country H and contagion to country F, respectively.
In what follows, I check whether the presence of hidden savings affects the probability
of default and contagion, and how that is in turn affected by the structure of the interbank
market.
5.2 Autarky with Domestic Hidden Markets
In section 4.1 I showed that when countries are in complete autarky, in the sense that they
have no cross-country relationships with each other, the equilibrium consumption allocation
is highly inefficient: banks are not able to provide consumption insurance over the amount
agents would get if no banks were present. Moreover, I showed that the portfolio allocation
emerging in equilibrium is highly inefficient, as banks do not invest enough in liquid assets.
Such inefficiency is reflected in the resilience of the system to unexpected perturbations.
When the state S¯ is realized, the total extra demand for liquidity faced by banks in H is
cH1 (0) = , while the total available buffer is only equal to r. That means in the current
environment banks in H go bankrupt when hit by unexpected shocks. This happens despite
the fact that banks in equilibrium invest too much in the long asset: the reason for such
result indeed lies in the fact that banks are forced by incentive compatibility to entitle late
consumers with too much consumption.
What about contagion? Given that there are no international connections between the
two countries, banks in F do not suffer from the default in H. There is no contagion.
5.3 Autarky with International Hidden Markets
The analysis of section 4.2 showed that in an autarkic equilibrium the presence of cross-
sectoral hidden borrowing and lending makes banks specialize their investment strategies
in the asset for which they enjoy a comparative advantage. That means banks in country
H only hold short assets, banks in F only hold long assets, and depositors in both countries
trade in the shadow market: late consumers in H lend, and early consumers in F borrow.
What happens when I perturb the equilibrium via the realization of the state S¯? Banks
in H now face a higher number of early consumers and a correspondingly lower number
of late consumers, but they invested all their deposits in short asset anyway, hence no
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bankruptcy is started: banks in H are solvent. Similarly, also banks in F are perfectly
solvent, as there is no contagion.
The fact that there are neither bankruptcy nor contagion does not mean that the
unforeseen liquidity need does not have any effect in this economy. In fact, it does influence
the ex post allocation of resources, in particular among those agents who rely on the shadow
market to fulfill their consumption. To see this, notice that at S¯ the return on the shadow
market spikes up, as RA = pi
F (0)
piH(1)−Rˆ
F > pi
F (0)
piH(1)
RˆF . This in turn affects the distribution of
income between late consumers in country H (lenders) and early consumers in country F
(borrowers). To be more specific, the first ones enjoy a higher return on their lending, and
are therefore better off, while the second ones pay a higher return on their borrowing, so
they lose from the unexpected unfavorable state.
5.4 Liberalized Economy with International Hidden Markets
In section 4.3 I showed that in an equilibrium with free interbank markets intermediaries
make cross-country deposits in order to exploit regulatory comparative advantages and
consequent gains from financial integration. In this way, banks provide perfect cross-country
risk sharing. At the same time, I also proved that the presence of hidden savings still limits
intertemporal risk sharing.
The analysis of this case is similar the one for complete autarky. By plugging the
equilibrium allocation into (29), it is easy to see that the unexpected realization of state
S¯ always leads to bankruptcy in country H, because:
 > fH(piH(0) + ) = r (33)
that is, the extra liquidity need is bigger than the available buffer. If that is the case, the
amount of resources intermediaries are able to transfer to their depositors, as characterized
by (31), is:
qH =
rµH + (1− r)piH(0)
µH + piF (0)
(34)
which is clearly less than one because the numerator is a linear combination of µH and
piH(0) < µH , while the denominator is bigger than µH .
What happens to intermediaries in country F? Notice that the available buffer fF (piF (0))
is actually zero, and that they have to cover for the loss of their investments in sector H.
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Condition (32) is therefore satisfied:
piF (0)(1− qHI ) > fF (piF (0)) = 0 (35)
The appearance of state S¯ then always leads to contagion, too. The intuition for this
result is straightforward: as I pointed out earlier, the presence of hidden savings imposes a
burden on the amount of risk sharing that banks can provide. In particular, banks are not
able to optimally compress the ex post income profile of their customers as the planner
does, and offer too much consumption to late consumers. As a consequence, the investment
in liquidity in this environment are always sub-optimal, and the available buffer always not
enough, leading to generalized default.
5.5 Regulated Equilibrium
As a last case, I analyze the stability of the financial system to intrinsic shocks when the
socially optimal allocation is implemented. This is an important comparison, because I
prove in Appendix C that there exist a simple regulatory intervention in the form of an
liquidity-to-capital ratio that implements the efficient allocation in both autarky and inte-
grated equilibrium. Therefore, this third case is equivalent to the analysis of an optimally
regulated economy.
Then the question I want to ask is the following: can regulation improve the resilience
of integrated competitive equilibrium? In order to answer this question, I apply the same
methodology of the previous subsections to the constrained efficient allocation. The extra
amount of liquidity needed by banks in H is I∗. On the other side, notice that the invest-
ment in long asset induced by regulation is Y H∗ = piH(1)R∗I∗/RˆF , hence the total available
buffer is rR∗I∗/RˆF . Clearly, since I proved in section 3 that R∗I∗ < RˆF , the buffer is not
enough to cover for any unexpected liquidity need, hence banks in H go bankrupt even in
presence of optimal regulation. The intuition for this result lies in the fact that optimal
regulation pushes banks on one side to hold more liquidity, but on the other to promise
a higher amount of consumption good to the early consumers. Thus, when an unexpected
shock is realized banks end up with a higher liquidity need and a lower buffer than they
would have with no regulation at all.
The value of the consumption bundle banks in H provide at default can be derived
from (31) by noticing that the investment in short asset induced by optimal regulation is
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XH∗ = piH(0)I∗. Therefore:
qH =
I∗
[
r R
∗
RˆF
µH +
(
1− r R∗
RˆF
)
piH(0)
]
µH + piF (0)
< I∗ (36)
Then the amount of extra liquidity needed by banks in F is piF (0)(I∗− qH) > 0, but again
the buffer is equal to zero, hence there is contagion. Optimal regulation does not improve
the resilience of an integrated financial system to unexpected perturbations.
5.6 Summary
The results of this sections are complementary to those of the previous one. Were the
economy divided into autarkic regions, I prove that international shadow markets would
distort the optimal allocation of consumption towards late consumption, and push banks
to specialize their investment strategies. That in turn is beneficial for the resilience of the
financial system, that always have enough resources to cover for extra liquidity needs. As I
stressed before, that does not come at no cost, though: unexpected liquidity shocks would
still produce winners and losers from the redistribution of resources via the hidden market.
When the interbank market is opened, the positive stabilizing effect of hidden markets
instead disappears, as banks in H do trade with banks in F and therefore do not specialize
in liquid assets. Therefore, banks always go bankrupt, and there is always contagion. The
introduction of optimal regulation, to overcome the inefficient allocation of resources in
competitive equilibrium, in fact does not positively affect the instability of the system, as
banks are forced to hold less long assets and therefore lower their buffer. Again, the role of
hidden markets in inducing financial contagion then crucially depends on the underlying
structure of the interbank market.
6 Some Historical Background
The results from the previous sections have some important parallels with the debate about
the so called ”Savings & Loan Debacle”.
Savings and Loan Associations (also S&Ls) are financial institutions whose main ac-
tivity is the provision of savings accounts and residential mortgages. In 1966, a period
of profound financial turbulence close to the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, U.S.
Congress passed the Interest Rate Adjustment Act (also known as ”Regulation Q”) with
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the aim of strictly regulating banking activities. In particular, S&Ls were on one side re-
stricted to offer only savings accounts, and on the other allowed to pay as interest only
50 basis points more than that offered by commercial banks.9 In that way, the adminis-
tration thought of preserving the social role of such associations in the supply of home
mortgages.10 Nevertheless, such constraints soon became a burden on S&Ls, as many cus-
tomers withdrew their deposits in order to invest in other instruments, such as money
market funds, that at the time provided higher yields. Such a phenomenon became known
as ”disintermediation”, and resembles the mechanism underlying the autarky equilibrium
with international hidden markets that I showed in section 4.2: banks specialize in the
asset for which they enjoy a comparative advantage, and agents exploit hidden markets to
adjust their consumption allocation.
At last, when the interest rates ceilings on deposits were completely removed by the
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, S&Ls were allowed to raise interest
rates in order to increase their profitability. Such deregulation is easily comparable to a
switch from the autarkic equilibrium to the liberalized equilibrium proposed in section 4.3.
The main parallel between the history of S&Ls and the present model lies in the timing
of bankruptcy that affected those institutions between the Eighties and the beginning
of the Nineties, and spread out to the whole U.S. financial system, as I show in figure
1. Remember the conclusion from the previous section: first, in a autarkic equilibrium
with cross-sectoral hidden markets bankruptcy never happens; second, in an integrated
equilibrium unexpected shocks to fundamentals always lead to bank defaults and contagion.
That may give an explanation to what happened in the American financial system at that
time, too: in the Seventies - a period characterized by extreme financial instability - the
rigidly separated system, although inefficient, may have provided a way to avoid generalized
bankruptcy in the banking sector. The introduction of looser limitations at the beginning of
the Eighties, with the clear aim of increasing profitability and ensure a better risk sharing,
may instead have had as a side effect a lower resilience of the system to financial shocks.
7 Conclusion
The main question I address in the present paper is: what is the role of unobservable
borrowing and lending in affecting liberalization and contagion in the financial system?
9Interest rates for commercial banks were centrally fixed, too.
10More details are available in the extensive book by White (1991) and in the publications by FDIC
(1997).
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I showed that the answer crucially depends on the openness of the underlying interbank
market. In general, hidden markets impose a burden on financial intermediaries, who are
not able to improve risk sharing in equilibrium. On the other hand, they might also have a
positive effect on the welfare of the economy, if they substitute for the absence of interna-
tional official markets. Moreover, by inducing specialization in the investment strategy, they
might also improve the resilience of the financial system to unexpected liquidity shocks.
To put it differently, the effect of hidden markets on financial intermediation is therefore
controversial.
This analysis is admittedly incomplete. First of all, it might be useful to extend it to
a multicountry environment, in order to study different networks of banks and different
channels for contagion. More importantly, here intermediaries have no way to predict fu-
ture shocks, and eventually insure against unexpected liquidity needs. Therefore, a more
complete environment should formally introduce aggregate uncertainty and markets for
state-contingent claims, that banks can use to share risks. This is the way I am currently
seeking in a companion paper (Panetti, 2011). More work is needed in that direction.
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A Why only bonds in the shadow market?
I follow the analysis in Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007). Remember that, when borrowing and
lending, individual types are still private information. In order to complete the set of traded
securities, we may then add claims paying 1 unit of the consumption good conditional on
reporting type θ. Define the price of such securities as Q(θ). Notice that 1/R is the price
of a risk-free bond delivering one unit of consumption in the following period for each unit
invested today. I can prove the following:
Lemma 6. Q(θ) ≥ 1
R
for every type θ ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. I prove the lemma by contradiction. Assume Q(θ′) < 1
R
for some θ′. That would
give rise to arbitrage opportunities: agents would buy infinitely many of such securities, sell
uncontingent bonds in the same amount, then report exactly type θ′, and enjoys infinite
utility. That cannot be an equilibrium. 
Given that Q(θ) ≥ 1
R
, it is easy to argue that no type-contingent claims will be traded:
individuals will never exchange securities which yield one unit of consumption if a specific
type is reported, when they have the opportunity to trade a cheaper bond which yields
one unit of consumption whatever type is reported.
B Liberalized Economy without Hidden Savings
In this appendix, I characterize the decentralized equilibrium with integrated interbank
markets in absence of the shadow markets for borrowing and lending. I also show that it
is constrained efficient, i.e. the allocation of consumption satisfies the conditions for an
equilibrium in section 3. In line with the assumption in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), here
I still assume that individual types are private information, hence banks need to impose
incentive compatibility in writing the deposit contract. Therefore, in what follows the
only difference from the problems defined in section 4.3 is that the incentive compatibility
constraint now reads:
U(Ci(θ), θ) ≥ U(Ci(θ′), θ) (37)
for every θ, θ′ ∈ {0, 1}. This means no agent has incentive to wrongfully report her type. I
can prove the following result:
Lemma 7. The integrated equilibrium with no shadow markets is constrained efficient.
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Proof. Given that the system is integrated, banks in H will invest in F’s long asset by
making an interbank deposit. Banks then solve:
max
ci1(θ),c
i
2(θ)
∑
θ
U(Ci(θ), θ) (38)
subject to the resource constraint in (24) and the incentive compatibility in (37). Guess the
incentive compatibility constraint is slack. Attach multiplier λ to the resource constraint.
The first order conditions with respect to ci1(0) and c
i
2(1) are respectively:
u′(ci1(0)) = λ
βRˆFu′(ci2(1)) = λ
Therefore an Euler equation regulates the intertemporal allocation between early and late
consumers. Moreover, given that banks in every country have the same investment strategy
they provide the very same consumption bundle, hence there is perfect cross-country risk
sharing, too. Finally, I need to verify that the incentive compatibility is actually slack. This
is true if the present discounted value of the consumption bundle received by each type
is bigger than the one they might receive if they report incorrectly. This is equivalent to
prove the following corollary:
Corollary 1. In an integrated equilibrium without hidden markets ci1(0) > 1 and c
i
2(1) <
RˆF .
Proof. Assume not, i.e. ci1(0) < 1. Then the resource constraint implies c
i
2(1) > Rˆ
F . From
the Euler equation and the fact that relative risk aversion is bigger than or equal to one,11
we have:
βRˆF =
u′(ci1(0))
u′(ci2(1))
≥ c
i
2(1)
ci1(0)
≥ RˆF (39)
which is impossible because β < 1. This ends the proof. 

11See lemma 11 in Appendix D.
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C Optimal Regulation
In section 4, I showed that the main problem of the competitive equilibrium, either with
autarkic or integrated markets, stems in a return on the shadow market R that is not
efficient. Optimal regulation will then give incentives to banks to act in such a way so
that the hidden return is optimal. It may be argued that a competitive equilibrium with a
shadow return lower (or higher) than the one emerging from arbitrage actually cannot be
an equilibrium by definition (that is exactly the way we proved lemmas 4 and 5), because
it would push banks to invest only in the asset with higher yield, and give no resources
to some agents. That is the intuition for why optimal regulation takes the form of capital
requirements. From a technical point of view, the banking problem looks exactly the same
as before, but with the addition of a further constraint. The design problem is then to find
the optimal binding constraint that induces banks to provide the efficient allocation.
C.1 Autarky with International Hidden Markets
Given that RˆF > RˆH > 1, in order to fully characterize optimal regulation I need to take
into account two different cases.
Case 1: RH > Rˆ∗. Here the efficient return on the shadow market is so low (relative risk
aversion is so high) that banks in both sectors would find convenient to invest only in
their long assets, had they to face such hidden return. Therefore, in order for that to be
an equilibrium, we need to impose a liquidity floor, i.e. a minimum capital requirement,
on both sectors, so that banks have enough (actually, the optimal amount of) resources
to provide consumption to depositors in early liquidity need. The capital requirement
constraint reads: ∑
θ
pii(θ)ci1(θ) ≥ F iµi (40)
where F i is the capital requirement, expressed as total investment in the short asset as a
percentage of total capital.
Case 2: RˆF > R∗ > RˆH. Here the efficient return on the shadow market is high enough
(relative risk aversion is low enough) that banks in H(F) will still find convenient to invest
only in the short(long) asset. Therefore, in order for that to be an equilibrium, I need to
impose the correct liquidity ceiling to banks in H (lower than 100 percent), and the correct
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liquidity floor to banks in F (bigger than zero). Formally, it must be the case that:
∑
θ
pii(θ)ci1(θ)

≤ F iµi i = H
≥ F iµi i = F
(41)
The banking problem is therefore defined as the maximization of (11), subject to in-
centive compatibility (3), the budget constraint (12) and the capital requirement defined
by either (40) or (41). The following can be proved:
Lemma 8. With autarkic markets, the optimal capital requirement F i in each sector i ∈
{H,F} is:
F i =
pii(0)I∗
µi
According to the country, such requirement is a liquidity floor or a ceiling.
Proof. In the following. 
C.2 Liberalized Economy with International Hidden Markets
Remember that in the case of integrated equilibrium banks are allowed to invest one into
each other via the interbank market. As a consequence, I showed that banks in both sectors
will invest in H’s short asset and F’s long asset. Nevertheless, inefficiency arises because the
return on the shadow market is too high, leading to a sub-optimal portfolio allocation. In
order to have a hidden return lower than RˆF as a decentralized market outcome, we then
need to impose on every bank a minimum capital requirement similar to the one in (40),
otherwise with R < RˆF every bank would exclusively invest in the long asset. It comes
out that, despite the underlying differences between the two cases, optimal regulation in
an integrated economy is similar to the one in autarky:
Lemma 9. With integrated markets, the optimal capital requirement F i in each sector
i ∈ {H,F} takes the form of a liquidity floor:
F i =
pii(0)I∗
µi
Proof. I solve for case 2 (RˆF > R∗ < RˆH) in sector H in the autarkic equilibrium, as the
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other cases have similar proofs. The regulated banking problem is:
max
{CH(θ)}θ∈{0,1}
piH(0)u
(
cH1 (0) +
cH2 (0)
R
)
+ βpiH(1)u(RcH1 (1) + c
H
2 (1))
subject to:
∑
θ
piH(θ)
[
cH1 (θ) +
cH2 (θ)
RˆH
]
≤ µH
cH1 (0) +
cH2 (0)
R
= cH1 (1) +
cH2 (1)
R
piH(0)cH1 (0) + pi
H(1)cH1 (1) ≤ FHµH
Apply the following change of variable:
IH = cH1 (0) +
cH2 (0)
R
HH =
1
µH
[piH(0)cH1 (0) + pi
H(1)cH1 (1)]
so that the problem now reads:
max
IH ,HH
piH(0)u(IH) + βpiH(1)u(RIH)
subject to:
IH −HH
(
1
R
− 1
RˆH
)
≤ 1 (42)
IH − H
H
R
≤ FH (43)
Attach multipliers ξ and λ, respectively. The first order conditions are:
IH : piH(0)u′(IH) + βRpiH(1)u′(RIH) = λ+ ξ (44)
HH :
λ
R
+ ξ
(
1
R
− 1
RˆH
)
= 0 (45)
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Plug (45) into (44) and derive:
ξ =
RˆH
R
[
piH(0)u′(IH) + βRpiH(1)u′(RIH)
]
(46)
which is nonnegative because of the assumption of concavity of the felicity function. We
want to derive the capital requirement FH which is consistent with the implementation of
the efficient allocation. Substitute the latter in the characterization of the equilibrium:
R = R∗
IH = IH
HH =
1
µH
piH(1)R∗IH
From (45), given that RˆH < R∗, we have that also λ > 0: the liquidity ceiling is binding.
At last, by plugging the efficient allocation in (43) we derive the solution to FH . 
In all cases, the capital requirement takes the form of an liquidity-to-capital ratio:
in order for the decentralized equilibrium to implement the efficient allocation, banks are
indeed forced to invest a specific amount of their total deposits into short assets. Depending
on relative risk aversion (which affects efficient pricing), the technology available to each
sector and the interbank market structure, the previous lemmas show that such obligation
is enforced through a liquidity floor or ceiling. The modified portfolio allocation is exactly
enough to provide to all early consumers the efficient amount of consumption.
D Proofs
Proof of lemma 1. Rewrite the problem of the agent in the shadow market as:
V (Ci(θ), R, θ) = max
xi1,x
i
2,b
i,θ′
U(xi1, x
i
2, θ)
s.t. xi1 +
x2
R
= ci1(θ
′) +
ci2(θ
′)
R
For type 1 and 2, the incentive compatibility then respectively reads:
V (Ci(0), R, 0) ≥ V (Ci(1), R, 0)
V (Ci(1), R, 1) ≥ V (Ci(0), R, 1)
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which can be rewritten as:
u
(
ci1(0) +
ci2(0)
R
)
≥ u
(
ci1(1) +
ci2(1)
R
)
u(Rci1(1) + c
i
2(1)) ≥ u(Rci1(0) + ci2(0))
The result then follows. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The definition of the constrained efficient allocation is standard:
Definition 3. Given an initial endowment e for any agent and a distribution of idiosyn-
cratic shocks {pii(θ)}, a constrained efficient allocation with shadow markets is a contract
{Ci(θ)} for any type and country and a portfolio choice {X, Y H , Y F} such that:
• The contract and the portfolio choice solve the planning problem
• Resources are exhausted: ∑
i
∑
θ
pii(θ)
[
ci1(θ) +
ci2(θ)
RˆB
]
= 1 (47)
In order to prove the lemma, I want to first reduce the dimentionality of the problem.
I can do this using the following result:
Lemma 10. Problem (4) is equivalent to:
max
R,{Ii}i∈{A,B}
∑
i
∑
θ
pii(θ)V˜ (I i, R, θ) (48)
subject to: ∑
i
∑
θ
pii(θ)
[
xi1(I i, R, θ) +
xi2(I i, R, θ)
RˆB
]
≤ 1 (49)
where V˜ , xi1 and x
i
2 come from the solution to:
V˜ (I i, R, θ) = max
xi1,x
i
2
U(xi1, x
i
2, θ) (50)
s.t. xi1 +
xi2
R
≤ I i
Proof. In order to prove that (4) and (48) are equivalent, I need to show that the alloca-
tion that solves the first can be implemented for some {R, I i} satisfying (48), and that
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given {R∗, I i∗} solution to (48), we can set cit(θ) = xit(I i, R, θ) in (4) and check that such
allocation is feasible.
Take any {cit(θ)} solution to (4). By definition, such allocation satisfies incentive com-
patibility ci1(0) +
ci2(0)
R
= ci1(1) +
ci2(1)
R
. Call this present discounted value I i. Notice that
{cit(θ)} is solution to the hidden problem (1) with equilibrium return R, hence it also solves
(50) provided θ′ = θ, i.e. the true type is reported. This means that any solution to (4) can
be implemented with the correct choice of {R, I i}. This ends the first part of the proof.
Let us move to the second part. Assume {R∗, I i∗} is solution to (48). Pick cit(θ) =
xit(I i, R, θ). Clearly, the resource constraints are equivalent. Moreover, notice that:
I i∗ = ci1(0) +
ci2(0)
R
= ci1(1) +
ci2(1)
R
(51)
meaning that V˜ (I i, R, θ) = V (Ci(θ), R, θ), because with income I i∗ every agent does as
well by reporting the true type or the other. Given that {xit} solves (50), it must be the case
that U(ci1(θ), c
i
2(θ), θ) ≥ V (Ci(θ), R, θ), hence also incentive compatibility (6) is satisfied.
This ends the proof. 
Hence, I can solve (48) instead of (4). I do it by backward induction. For θ = 0, the
program in (50) reads:
max u(xi1) (52)
s.t. xi1 +
xi2
R
≤ I i
Clearly, xi1(I i, R, 0) = I i∗, and in a similar fashion xi2(I i, R, 1) = RI i∗. Plug these results
back, program (48) can be rewritten as:
max
R,{Ii}i∈{H,F}
∑
i
pii(0)u(I i∗) + βpii(1)u(RI i∗) (53)
subject to: ∑
i
I i∗
[
pii(0) + pii(1)
R
RˆF
]
≤ 1 (54)
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Attach multiplier λ to (54) and take first order conditions:
I i : pii(0)u′(I i) + βpii(1)u′(RI i)R = λ
[
pii(0) + pii(1)
R
RˆF
]
(55)
R : β
∑
i
pii(1)u′(RI i)I i = λ
RˆF
∑
i
pii(1)I i (56)
Multiply both sides of (55) by I i and sum across i. Using (56) this becomes:
λ =
∑
i pi
i(0)u′(I i)I i∑
i pi
i(0)I i > 0 (57)
Using (57) into (56):
βRˆF
∑
i
pii(1)u′(RI i)I i =
∑
i pi
i(0)u′(I i)I i∑
i pi
i(0)I i
∑
i
pii(1)I i (58)
It is easy to check that (58) is satisfied when the (unconstrained) efficient allocation in (8)
is plugged in.
In order to characterize R∗ as in (9), I need the following lemma:
Lemma 11. If relative risk aversion is greater than 1, then for any z1 and z2:
u′(z1)
u′(z2)
≥ z2
z1
(59)
Proof. Rewrite the assumption about RRA as as:
−u
′′(c)
u′(c)
≥ 1
c
(60)
Hence:
−(log[u′(c)])′ ≥ (log[c])′ (61)
Integrate (61) between z1 and z2 so as to obtain:
log[u′(z1)]− log[u′(z2)] ≥ log[z2]− log[z1] (62)
The latter gives (59) once taken the exponent. 
Using the result in lemma 11, the Euler equation characterizing the efficient allocation
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gives:
βRˆF =
u′(I∗)
u′(R∗I∗) ≥ R
∗ (63)
In order to prove that R∗ > 1, define:
f(R) =
u′(I∗)
u′(RI∗) − βRˆ
F (64)
Notice that R∗ is the value that sets f(R∗) = 0. Clearly, this function is everywhere
increasing in R, and f(1) = 1 − βRˆF < 0 by hypothesis, hence it must be the case that
R∗ > 1.
Given that I∗ is equal across sectors, the resource constraint gives:
I∗ = 1∑
i pi
i(0) + pii(1) R
∗
RˆF
(65)
which is bigger than 1 because R∗ < RˆF . To see that c2(1) < RˆF , notice that we can
rewrite the resource constraint as:
c2(1, s)
Rˆ(s)
=
1−∑i pii(0)c1(0)
1−∑i pii(0) < 1 (66)
At this allocation, no agent invests in the hidden market, because incentive compati-
bility is satisfied and ci1(1, s) = c
i
2(0, s) = 0. Finally, the derivation of the optimal total
investment in the short asset is trivial, once we plug ci1(θ) = I∗. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We take R as given, solve the banking problem in both countries,
then by market clearing characterize R. The optimal contract in country H is the solution
to the following program:
max
{cH1 (θ),cH2 (θ)}θ∈{0,1}
piH(0)u(cH1 (0)) + βpi
H(1)u(RcH1 (1))
subject to: ∑
θ
piH(θ)
[
cH1 (θ) +
cH2 (θ)
RˆH
]
≤ µH (67)
cH1 (0) +
cH2 (0)
R
= cH1 (1) +
cH2 (1)
R
Given that banks in country H only invest in the short technology, cH2 (0) = c
H
2 (1) = 0, and
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by incentive compatibility:
cH1 (0) = c
H
1 (1) (68)
On the other side, given that banks in F only invest in long technology, cF1 (0) = c
F
1 (1) = 0,
and by incentive compatibility cF2 (0) = c
F
2 (1). By market clearing in the bond market in
(19), this means:
cF2 (0) = c
F
2 (1) =
piA(1)
piF (0)
cA1 (1)R (69)
Using (68) and (69) in the resource constraint of the economy, and keeping in mind that
pii(0) + pii(1) = µi, we obtain:
cH1 (0) = c
H
1 (1) =
1
µH + µF pi
H(1)
piF (0)
R
RˆF
(70)
It is then easy to show that the proposed allocation solves the program and, together with
the market clearing condition for bonds, induces RA. As a last step, we need to ensure that
the budget constraints are not slack. Notice that the Lagrange multiplier on H’s budget λ
is equal to u′(cH1 (0)) > 0. Similar result applies to F. 
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Figure 1: Failures and assistance transactions by the FDIC, 1960-2010. Commercial Banks are defined
as (a) National chartered commercial bank supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
(b) State charter Fed member commercial bank supervised by the Federal Reserve, and (c) State charter
Fed nonmember commercial bank supervised by the FDIC. Saving Companies are defined as: (a) State or
federal charter savings association supervised by the Office of Thrift Supervision; (b) State charter savings
bank supervised by the FDIC. Source: FDIC, Historical Statistics on Banking.
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